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Abstract
We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an
auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally,
the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to maximize his
valuation function, without exceeding a given budget. As the resources are owned by
strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design mechanisms that are truthful,
budget-feasible, and obtain a good approximation to the optimal value. Budget-
feasibility creates additional challenges, making several approaches inapplicable
in this setting. Previous results on budget-feasible mechanisms have considered
mostly monotone valuation functions. In this work, we mainly focus on symmetric
submodular valuations, a prominent class of non-monotone submodular functions
that includes cut functions. We begin first with a purely algorithmic result, obtaining a
2e
e−1 -approximation for maximizing symmetric submodular functions under a budget
constraint. We view this as a standalone result of independent interest, as it is the
best known factor achieved by a deterministic algorithm. We then proceed to propose
truthful, budget feasible mechanisms (both deterministic and randomized), paying
particular attention on the Budgeted Max Cut problem. Our results significantly
improve the known approximation ratios for these objectives, while establishing
polynomial running time for cases where only exponential mechanisms were known.
At the heart of our approach lies an appropriate combination of local search algorithms
with results for monotone submodular valuations, applied to the derived local optima.
1 Introduction
We study a class of procurement auctions—also referred to as reverse auctions—with
budget constraints. In a procurement auction, an auctioneer is interested in buying goods
or services from a set of agents. In this setting, selecting an agent comes at a cost and
there is a hard budget constraint that should not be violated. The goal of the auctioneer
then is to select a budget-feasible subset of the agents so as to maximize his valuation
function v(·), where v(S) denotes the value derived when S is the selected subset of
agents to get services from.
The purely algorithmic version of the problem results in natural ‘‘budgeted’’ versions of
known optimization problems. Since these problems are typically NP-hard, our focus is on
approximation algorithms. Most importantly, in the setting considered here, the true cost
of each agent is private information and we would like to design mechanisms that elicit
∗A conference version appears in WINE 2017.
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truthful reporting by all agents. Hence, our ideal goal is to have truthful mechanisms
that achieve a good approximation to the optimal value for the auctioneer, and are budget
feasible, i.e., the sum of the payments to the agents does not exceed the prespecified
budget. This framework of budget feasible mechanisms is motivated by recent application
scenarios including crowdsourcing platforms, where agents can be viewed as workers
providing tasks (e.g., [4, 16]), and influence maximization in networks, where agents
correspond to influential users (see e.g., [31, 3], where the chosen objective is a coverage
function).
Budget feasibility makes the problem more challenging, with respect to truthfulness,
as it already rules out well known mechanisms such as VCG. We note that the algorithmic
versions of such problems often admit constant factor approximation algorithms. However,
it is not clear how to appropriately convert them into truthful budget feasible mechanisms.
The question is nontrivial even if we allow exponential time algorithms, since computational
power does not necessarily make the problem easier (see the discussion in [12]). All these
issues create an intriguing landscape, where one needs to strike a balance between the
incentives of the agents and the budget constraints.
The first positive results on this topic were obtained by Singer [30], for the case
where v(·) is an additive or a non-decreasing submodular function. Follow-up works
provided refinements and further results for richer classes of functions (see the related
work section). Most of these works, however, make the assumption that the valuation
function is non-decreasing, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for S ⊆ T , notable exceptions being the
works of [12] and [6]. Although monotonicity makes sense in several scenarios, one can
think of examples where it is violated. E.g., [12] studied the unweighted Budgeted Max
Cut problem, as an eminent example of a non-monotone submodular objective function.
Moreover, when studying models for influence maximization problems in social networks,
adding more users to the selected set may some times bring negative influence [7] (some
combinations of users may also not be compatible or well fitted together). Related to
this, in the setting of [3], an appealing class of objectives, under mild assumptions about
the underlying network, correspond to weighted cut functions. To further motivate the
study of non-monotone submodular objectives, consider the following well-studied sensor
placement problem [8, 11, 22]: assume that we want to monitor some spatial phenomenon
(e.g., the temperature of a specific environment), modeled as a Gaussian process. We
may place sensing devices on some of the prespecified locations, but each location has an
associated cost. A criterion for finding an optimal such placement, suggested by Caselton
and Zidek [8] for the unit cost case, is to maximize the mutual information between chosen
and non chosen locations, i.e., we search for the subset of locations that minimizes
the uncertainty about the estimates in the remaining space. Such mutual information
objectives are submodular but not monotone. In addition, it is straightforward to modify
this problem to model participatory crowdsensing scenarios where users have incentives
to lie about the true cost of installing a sensor.
It becomes apparent that we would like to aim for truthful mechanisms with good
performance for subclasses of non-monotone functions. At the moment, the few results
known for arbitrary non-monotone submodular functions have very large approximation
ratios and often superpolynomial running time. Even worse, in most cases, we do not
even know of deterministic mechanisms (see Table 1). In trying to impose more structure
so as to have better positive results, there is an interesting observation to make: the
examples that have been mentioned so far, i.e., cut functions and mutual information
functions are symmetric submodular, a prominent subclass of non-monotone submodular
functions, where the value of a set S equals the value of its complement. This subclass
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has received already considerable attention in operations research, see e.g., [15, 28],
where more examples are also provided. We therefore find that symmetric submodular
functions form a suitable starting point for the study of non-monotone functions.
Contribution: The main focus of this work is on symmetric1 submodular functions. As
suggested in [28], cut functions form a canonical example of this class. Consequently,
we use the budgeted Max Cut problem throughout the paper as an illustrative example
of how our more general approach could be refined for concrete objectives that have a
well-behaved LP formulation. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• In Section 3 we obtain a purely algorithmic result, namely a 2ee−1-approximation
for symmetric submodular functions under a budget constraint. We believe this is
of independent interest, as it is the best known factor achieved by a deterministic
algorithm (there exists already a randomized e-approximation) assuming only a
value oracle for the objective function.
• In Sections 4 and 5 we propose truthful, budget feasible mechanisms for arbitrary
symmetric submodular functions, where previously known results regarded only
randomized exponential mechanisms. We manage to significantly improve the
known approximation ratios of such objectives by providing both randomized and
deterministic mechanisms of exponential time. Moreover, we propose a general
scheme for producing constant factor approximation mechanisms that run in
polynomial time when the objective function is well-behaved. These results provide
partial answers to some of the open questions discussed in [12].
• In the same sections, aside from studying arbitrary symmetric submodular func-
tions, we also pay particular attention on the weighted and unweighted versions
of Budgeted Max Cut. For the weighted version we obtain the first deterministic
polynomial time mechanism with a 27.25-approximation (where only an exponen-
tial randomized algorithm was known with a 768-approximation), while for the
unweighted version we improve the approximation ratio for polynomial randomized
mechanisms, from 564 down to 10, and for polynomial deterministic mechanisms,
from 5158 down to 27.25.
• Finally, in Section 6 we briefly study the class of XOS functions, where we improve
the current upper bound by a factor of 3.
All our contributions in mechanism design are summarized in Table 1. We also stress
that our mechanisms for general symmetric submodular functions use the value query
model for oracle access to v, which is a much weaker requirement than the demand query
model assumed in previous works, e.g., in [12]..
Regarding the technical contribution of our work, the core idea of our approach is to
exploit a combination of local search with mechanisms for non-decreasing submodular
functions. The reason local search is convenient for symmetric submodular functions
is that it produces two local optima, and we can then prove that the function v(·) is
non-decreasing within each local optimum. This allows us to utilize mechanisms for
non-decreasing submodular functions on the two subsets and then prove that one of
the two solutions will attain a good approximation. The running time is still an issue
under this approach, since finding an exact local optimum is not guaranteed to terminate
1In some works on mechanism design, symmetric submodular functions have a different meaning and
refer to the case where v(S) depends only on |S|. Here we have adopted the terminology of earlier literature
on submodular optimization, e.g., [15].
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fast. However, even by finding approximate local optima, within each of them the
objective remains almost non-decreasing in a certain sense. This way we are still able
to appropriately adjust our mechanisms and obtain provable approximation guarantees.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this ‘‘robustness under small
deviations from monotonicity’ ’ approach is used to exploit known results for monotone
objectives.
symmetric submod. unweighted cut weighted cut XOS
rand. determ. rand. determ. rand. determ. rand.
Known 768 ∗ † – 564 5158 768 ∗ † – 768 ∗
This paper 10 ∗ 10.90 ∗, (1+ρ)
(
2+ρ+
√
ρ2+4ρ+ 1
)
10 27.25 27.25 244 ∗
Table 1: A summary of our results on mechanisms. The asterisk (∗) indicates that the
corresponding mechanism runs in superpolynomial time. The dagger (†) indicates that
previously known results do not directly apply here; see Remark 2.9 at the end of Section
2. The factor ρ is an upper bound on the ratio of the optimal fractional solution to the
integral one, assuming that we can find the former in polynomial time. The factor 768 is
due to [10], while the factors 564 and 5158 are due to [12].
Related Work: The study of budget feasible mechanisms, as considered here, was initiated
by Singer [30]. Later, Chen et al. [10] significantly improved Singer’s results, obtaining
a randomized 7.91-approximation mechanism and a deterministic 8.34-approximation
mechanism for non-decreasing submodular functions. Several modifications of the
mechanism by [10] have been proposed that run in polynomial time for special cases
[31, 19, 3]. For subadditive functions, Dobzinski et al. [12] suggested a randomized
O(log2 n)-approximation mechanism, and they gave the first constant factor mecha-
nisms for non-monotone submodular objectives, specifically for cut functions. The factor
for subadditive functions was later improved to O
( logn
log logn
)
by Bei et al. [6], who also
gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mechanism for XOS functions, albeit in expo-
nential time, and further initiated the Bayesian analysis in this setting. An improved
O(1)-approximation mechanism for XOS functions is also suggested in [25]. Recently,
Amanatidis et al. [3] suggested a 4-approximation mechanism for a subclass of XOS
functions that captures matroid and matching constraints. There is also a line of re-
lated work under the large market assumption (where no participant can significantly
affect the market outcome), which allows for polynomial time mechanisms with improved
performance [32, 4, 16, 5, 20].
On maximization of submodular functions subject to knapsack or other type of
constraints, there is a vast literature, going back several decades, see, e.g., [27, 34].
More recently Lee et al. [24] provided the first constant factor randomized algorithm for
submodular maximization under k matroid and k knapsack constraints, with factors
k + 2 + 1k and 5 respectively. The problem was also studied by Gupta et al. [18] who
proposed a randomized algorithm, which achieves a (4 + α)-approximation2 in case of
knapsack constraints, where α is the approximation guarantee of the unconstrained
submodular maximization. Later on Chekuri et al. [9] suggested a randomized 3.07-
approximation algorithm improving the previously known results. Finally, Feldman et
al. [14] and Kulik et al. [23] proposed their own randomized algorithms when there are
knapsack constraints, achieving an e-approximation.3
2In the case of symmetric submodular functions the algorithm gives a deterministic 6-approximation.
3The algorithm of [23] can be derandomized without any performance loss, but only assuming an additional
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2 Notation and Preliminaries
We use A = [n] = {1, 2, ..., n} to denote a set of n agents. Each agent i is associated
with a private cost ci, denoting the cost for participating in the solution. We consider a
procurement auction setting, where the auctioneer is equipped with a valuation function
v : 2A → Q≥0 and a budget B > 0. For S ⊆ A, v(S) is the value derived by the auctioneer
if the set S is selected (for singletons, we will often write v(i) instead of v({i})). Therefore,
the algorithmic goal in all the problems we study is to select a set S that maximizes v(S)
subject to the constraint
∑
i∈S ci ≤ B. We assume oracle access to v via value queries,
i.e., we assume the existence of a polynomial time value oracle that returns v(S) when
given as input a set S.
We mostly focus on a natural subclass of submodular valuation functions that includes
cut functions, namely non-negative symmetric submodular functions. Throughout this
work we make the natural assumption that v(∅) = 0.
Definition 2.1. A function v, defined on 2A for some set A, is submodular if v(S ∪ {i})−
v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ A, and i 6∈ T . Moreover, it is non-decreasing if
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ A, while it is symmetric if v(S) = v(A S) for any S ⊆ A.
It is easy to see that v cannot be both symmetric and non-decreasing unless it is a
constant function. In fact, if this is the case and v(∅) = 0, then v(S) = 0, for all S ⊆ A.
We also state an alternative definition of a submodular function, which will be useful later
on.
Theorem 2.2 (Nemhauser et al. [27]). A set function v is submodular if and only if for all
S, T ⊆ A we have v(T ) ≤ v(S) + ∑
i∈T S
(v(S∪{i})−v(S))− ∑
i∈S T
(v(S∪T )−v(S∪T {i})).
We often need to argue about optimal solutions of sub-instances, from an instance we
begin with. Given a cost vector c, and a subset X ⊆ A, we denote by cX the projection of
c on X, and by c−X the projection of c on A X. We also let opt(X, v, cX , B) be the value
of an optimal solution to the restriction of this instance on X, i.e., opt(X, v, cX , B) =
maxS:S⊆X, c(S)≤B v(S). Similarly, opt(X, v, cX ,∞) denotes the value of an optimal so-
lution to the unconstrained version of the problem restricted on X. For the sake of
readability, we usually drop the valuation function and the cost vector, and write opt(X,B)
or opt(X,∞).
Finally, in Sections 3-5 we make one further assumption: we assume that there is at
most one item whose cost exceeds the budget. As shown in Lemma A.1 and Corollary A.2
in Appendix A.1, this is without loss of generality.
Local Optima and Local Search. Given v : 2A → Q, a set S ⊆ A is called a (1 + )-
approximate local optimum of v, if (1 + )v(S) ≥ v(S {i}) and (1 + )v(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i})
for every i ∈ A. When  = 0, S is called an exact local optimum of v. Note that if v is
symmetric submodular, then S is a (1 + )-approximate local optimum if and only if A S
is a (1 + )-approximate local optimum.
Approximate local optima produce good approximations in unconstrained maximization
of general submodular functions [13]. However, here they are of interest for a quite different
reason that becomes apparent in Lemmata 3.1 and 4.1. We can efficiently find approximate
local optima using the local search algorithm Approx-Local-Search of [13]. Note that this
oracle for the extension by expectation, say V , of the objective function v. When only an oracle for v is
available, estimation of V by sampling is required in general.
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is an algorithm for the unconstrained version of the problem, when there are no budget
constraints.
Approx-Local-Search(A, v, ) [13]
1 S = {i∗}, where i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A v(i)
2 while there exists some a such that max{v(S ∪ {a}), v(S {a})} > (1 + /n2)v(S) do
3 if v(S ∪ {a}) > (1 + /n2)v(S) then
4 S = S ∪ {a}
5 else
6 S = S {a}
7 return S
If we care to find an exact local optimum, we can simply set  = 0. In this case,
however, we cannot argue about the running time of the algorithm in general.
Lemma 2.3 (inferred from [13]). Given a submodular function v : 2[n] → Q≥0 and a value
oracle for v, Approx-Local-Search(A, v, ) outputs a
(
1 + 
n2
)
-approximate local optimum
using O
(
1
n
3 log n
)
calls to the oracle.
2.1 Mechanism Design
In the strategic version that we consider here, every agent i only has his true cost ci as
private information. A mechanismM = (f, p) in our context consists of an outcome rule
f and a payment rule p. Given a vector of cost declarations, b = (bi)i∈A, where bi denotes
the cost reported by agent i, the outcome rule of the mechanism selects the set f(b). At
the same time, it computes payments p(b) = (pi(b))i∈A where pi(b) denotes the payment
issued to agent i. Hence, the final utility of agent i is pi(b)− ci.
The main properties we want to ensure for our mechanisms are the following.
Definition 2.4. A mechanismM = (f, p) is
1. truthful, if reporting ci is a dominant strategy for every agent i.
2. individually rational, if pi(b) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ A, and pi(b) ≥ ci, for every i ∈ f(b).
3. budget feasible, if
∑
i∈A pi(b) ≤ B for every b.
For randomized mechanisms, we use the notion of universal truthfulness, which means
that the mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
We say that an outcome rule f is monotone, if for every agent i ∈ A, and any vector of
cost declarations b, if i ∈ f(b), then i ∈ f(b′i,b−i) for b′i ≤ bi. This simply means that if
an agent i is selected in the outcome by declaring cost bi, then by declaring a lower cost
he should still be selected. Myerson’s lemma below implies that monotone algorithms
admit truthful payment schemes.
Lemma 2.5 (Myerson’s lemma [26]). Given a monotone algorithm f , there is a unique
payment scheme p such that (f, p) is a truthful and individually rational mechanism, given
by
pi(b) =
{
supbi∈[ci,∞){bi : i ∈ f(bi, b−i)} , if i ∈ f(b)
0 , otherwise
The payments in Lemma 2.5 are often referred to as threshold payments, since they
indicate the threshold at which an agent stops being selected. Myerson’s lemma simplifies
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the design of truthful mechanisms by focusing only on constructing monotone algorithms
and not having to worry about the payment scheme. Nevertheless, in the setting we study
here budget feasibility clearly complicates things further. For all the algorithms presented
in the next sections, we always assume that the underlying payment scheme is given by
Myerson’s lemma.
Mechanisms for Non-Decreasing Submodular Valuations. In the mechanisms we
design for non-monotone submodular functions, we will repeatedly make use of truthful
budget feasible mechanisms for non-decreasing submodular functions as subroutines.
The best known such mechanisms are due to Chen et al. [10]. Here, we follow the improved
analysis of [20] for the approximation ratio of the randomized mechanism Rand-Mech-SM
of [10], stated below.
Rand-Mech-SM(A, v, c, B) [10]
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 with probability 25 return i
∗
3 with probability 35 return Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2)
The mechanism Greedy-SM is a greedy algorithm that picks agents according to their
ratio of marginal value over cost, given that this cost is not too large. For the sake of
presentation, we assume the agents are sorted in descending order with respect to this
ratio. The marginal value of each agent is calculated with respect to the previous agents
in the ordering, i.e., 1 = arg maxj∈A
v(j)
cj
and i = arg maxj∈A\[i−1]
v([j])−v([j−1])
cj
for i ≥ 2.
Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2) [10]
1 Let k = 1 and S = ∅
2 while k ≤ |A| and v(S ∪ {k}) > v(S) and ck ≤ B2 · v(S∪{k})−v(S)v(S∪{k}) do
3 S = S ∪ {k}
4 k = k + 1
5 return S
Lemma 2.6 (inferred from [10] and [20]). Greedy-SM is monotone. Assuming a non-
decreasing submodular function v and the payments of Myerson’s lemma, Greedy-SM(A, v, c,
B/2) is budget-feasible and outputs a set S such that v(S) ≥ 13 · opt(A,B)− 23 · v(i∗).
A derandomized version of Rand-Mech-SM is also provided by [10]. It has all the desired
properties, while suffering a small loss on the approximation factor. Here, following the
improved analysis of [20] for the ratio of Rand-Mech-SM, we fine-tune this derandomized
mechanism to obtain Mech-SM that has a better approximation guarantee.
Mech-SM(A, v, c, B)
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 if (2 +
√
6) · v(i∗) ≥ opt(A {i∗}, B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 return Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2)
The next theorem summarizes the properties of Rand-Mech-SM and Mech-SM.
7
Theorem 2.7 (inferred from [10], [20], and Lemma D.2). Rand-Mech-SM runs in polynomial
time, it is universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, and has approximation
ratio 5. Mech-SM is deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, and has
approximation ratio 3 +
√
6.
Proof. Monotonicity (and thus truthfulness and individual rationality) and budget-feasibility
of both mechanisms directly follow from [10]. What is left to show are the approximation
guarantees.
The key fact here is the following lemma from [20]. Note that the lemma also follows
from Lemma D.2 for  = 0 and β = 0.5. For the rest of this proof, S will denote the
outcome of Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2).
Lemma 2.8 ([20]). opt(A,B) ≤ 3 · v(S) + 2 · v(i∗).
For Rand-Mech-SM, if X denotes the outcome of the mechanism, then directly by Lemma
2.8 we have E(v(X)) ≥ 35v(S) + 25v(i∗) ≥ 15 opt(A,B), thus proving the approximation
ratio.
For Mech-SM we consider two cases:
If i∗ is returned by the mechanism, then (2+
√
6)·v(i∗) ≥ opt(A {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A,B)−
v(i∗), and therefore opt(A,B) ≤ (3 +√6) · v(i∗).
On the other hand, if S is returned, then (2+
√
6) ·v(i∗) < opt(A {i∗}, B) ≤ opt(A,B).
Combining this with Lemma 2.8 we have opt(A,B) ≤ 3 · v(S) + 2
2+
√
6
opt(A,B) and
therefore opt(A,B) ≤ 3(2+
√
6)√
6
· v(S) = (3 +√6) · v(S).
Remark 2.9. In [6] the proposed mechanisms regard XOS and non-decreasing subadditive
objectives, but it is stated that their results can be extended for general subadditive
functions as well. This is achieved by defining vˆ(S) = maxT⊆S v(T ). It is easily seen
that vˆ is non-decreasing, subadditive, and any solution that maximizes v is also an
optimal solution for vˆ. Although this is true for subadditive functions, it does not hold
for submodular functions. In particular, if v is submodular, then vˆ is not necessarily
submodular. Therefore the results of [10] cannot be extended to our setting, even when
time complexity is not an issue. An example of how vˆ may fail to be submodular when v
is a cut function is given in Appendix A.2, where we also discuss how it can be derived
from [17] that in such cases vˆ is actually XOS. This also implies that the best previously
known approximation factor for the class of symmetric submodular functions was indeed
768 (inherited by the use of vˆ).
3 The Core Idea: A Simple Algorithm for Symmetric Submod-
ular Objectives
This section deals with the algorithmic version of the problem: given a symmetric
submodular function v, the goal is to find S ⊆ A that maximizes v(S) subject to the
constraint
∑
i∈S ci ≤ B. The main result is a deterministic 2ee−1 -approximation algorithm
for symmetric submodular functions. For this section only, the costs and the budget are
assumed to be integral.
Since our function is not monotone, we cannot directly apply the result of [33], which
gives an optimal simple greedy algorithm for non-decreasing submodular maximization
subject to a knapsack constraint. Instead, our main idea is to combine appropriately
the result of [33] with the local search used for unconstrained symmetric submodular
maximization [13]. At a high level, what happens is that local search produces an
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approximate solution S for the unconstrained problem, and while this does not look
related to our goal at first sight, v is ‘‘close to being non-decreasing’’ on both S and A S.
This becomes precise in Lemma 3.1 below, but the point is that running a modification
of the greedy algorithm of [33], on both S and A S will now produce at least one good
enough solution.
LS-Greedy(A, v, c, B, )
1 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, /4)
2 T1 = Greedy-Enum-SM(S, v, cS , B)
3 T2 = Greedy-Enum-SM(A S, v, cA S , B)
4 Let T be the best solution among T1 and T2
5 return T
The first component of our algorithm is the local search algorithm of [13]. By Lemma
2.3 and the fact that v is symmetric, both S and A S are
(
1 + 
4n2
)
-approximate local
optima. We can now quantify the crucial observation that v is close to being non-decreasing
within the approximate local optima S and A S. Actually, we only need this property on
the local optimum that contains the best feasible solution.
Lemma 3.1. Let S be a
(
1 + 
4n2
)
-approximate local optimum and consider
X ∈ arg max
Z∈{S,A S}
opt(Z,B) .
Then, for every T ( X and every i ∈ X T , we have v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) > − n opt(X,B).
Before proving Lemma 3.1, we begin with a simple fact and a useful lemma. We note
that Fact 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 below require only subadditivity. Submodularity is used
later, within the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Fact 3.2. For any S ⊆ A, max{opt(S,B), opt(A S,B)} ≥ 0.5 opt(A,B) since opt(S,B) +
opt(A S,B) ≥ opt(A,B) by subadditivity.
Lemma 3.3. For any S ⊆ A, opt(S,∞) ≤ 2n · opt(A,B).
Proof. Recall that |{i ∈ A | ci > B}| ≤ 1. Let S∗ ⊆ S be such that v(S∗) = opt(S,∞). By
subadditivity we have opt(S,∞) = v(S∗) ≤∑i∈S∗ v(i). Consider three cases.
If {i ∈ A | ci > B} = ∅, then by the fact that every singleton is a feasible solution we have∑
i∈S∗ v(i) ≤ n ·maxi∈A v(i) ≤ n · opt(A,B).
If {i ∈ A | ci > B} = {x} * S∗, then every singleton in A {x} is a feasible solution, and
like before we have
∑
i∈S∗ v(i) ≤ (n− 1) ·maxi∈A {x} v(i) ≤ (n− 1) · opt(A,B).
If {i ∈ A | ci > B} = {x} ⊆ S∗, then we need to bound v(x). Since v is symmetric
we have v(x) = v(A {x}) ≤ ∑i∈A {x} v(i) ≤ (n − 1) · maxi∈A {x} v(i). Therefore, by
using again that every singleton in A {x} is a feasible solution, we have ∑i∈S∗ v(i) ≤
v(x) + (n− 1) ·maxi∈A {x} v(i) ≤ (2n− 2) ·maxi∈A {x} v(i) ≤ 2n · opt(A,B).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By Fact 3.2 we have opt(X,B) ≥ 0.5 opt(A,B). Let T ⊆ X {i}
for some i ∈ X. By submodularity we have v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≥ v(X) − v(X {i}).
Since S is a
(
1 + 
4n2
)
-approximate local optimum and v is symmetric, X is also a(
1 + 
4n2
)
-approximate local optimum. As a result, v(X {i}) ≤ (1 + 
4n2
)
v(X) and
thus v(X)− v(X {i}) ≥ − 
4n2
v(X) ≥ − 
4n2
opt(X,∞) ≥ − 2n opt(A,B) ≥ − n opt(X,B),
where the second to last inequality follows from Lemma 3.3.
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The second component of LS-Greedy is an appropriate modification of the greedy
algorithm of [33] for non-monotone submodular functions. It first enumerates all solutions
of size at most 3. Then, starting from each 3-set, it builds a greedy solution, and it outputs
the best among these Θ(n3) solutions. Here this idea is adjusted for non-monotone
functions.
Greedy-Enum-SM(A, v, c, B)
1 Let S1 be the best feasible solution of cardinality at most 3 (by enumerating all such
solutions)
2 S2 = ∅
3 for every U ⊆ A with |U | = 3 do
4 T = U, t = 1, A0 = A U
5 while At−1 6= ∅ do
6 Find θt = max
i∈At−1
v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )
ci
, and let it be an element of At−1 that attains θt
7 if θt ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈T∪{it} ci ≤ B then
8 T = T ∪ {it}
9 At = At−1 {it}
10 t = t+ 1
11 if v(T ) > v(S2) then
12 S2 = T
13 Let S be the best solution among S1 and S2
14 return S
By Fact 3.2, at least one of S and A S contains a feasible solution of value at least
0.5 opt(A,B). Lemma 3.1 guarantees that in this set, v is very close to a non-decreasing
submodular function. This is sufficient for Greedy-Enum-SM to perform almost as well as
if v was non-decreasing.
Theorem 3.4. For any  > 0, algorithm LS-Greedy achieves a
(
2e
e−1 + 
)
-approximation.
The proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Theorem 3.4 suggests that a straightforward composition of two well known greedy
algorithms achieves a good approximation for any symmetric submodular objective. We
believe this is of independent interest and could be useful for other problems involving
submodular optimization. From a mechanism design perspective, however, algorithm
LS-Greedy fails to be monotone and thus it cannot be used directly in the subsequent
sections. In the next two sections, we remedy the problem by removing the enumeration
part of the algorithm.
4 A First Take on Mechanism Design
Utilizing the algorithmic approach of Section 3 to get truthful mechanisms is not straight-
forward. One of the reasons is that LS-Greedy is not monotone. We note that the
algorithm Greedy-Enum-SM without the enumeration part is monotone even for general
objectives, but, to further complicate things, it is not guaranteed to be budget-feasible
or have a good performance anymore. Instead of computing approximate local optima
like in Section 3, in this section we bypass most issues by computing exact local optima.
The highlights of this simplified approach are polynomial mechanisms for unweighted cut
functions with greatly improved guarantees.
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The price we have to pay, however, is that in general, finding exact local optima
is not guaranteed to run in polynomial time [29]. Still, these mechanisms deepen our
understanding of the problem. As mentioned in the Introduction, the problem seems to
remain hard even when the running time is not an issue, and many existing mechanisms
for various classes of functions are not polynomial. In particular, there are no better known
mechanisms—even running in exponential time—for symmetric submodular objectives.
We are going to deal further with the issue of running time in Section 5.
Below we give a randomized mechanism that reduces the known factor of 768 down
to 10, as well as the first deterministic O(1)-approximation mechanism for symmetric
submodular objectives. In both mechanisms, local search produces a local maximum S
for the unbudgeted problem and then the budgeted problem is solved optimally on both
S and A S. As shown in Lemma 4.1, v is non-decreasing on both S and A S. Thus,
running the mechanism Rand-Mech-SM or Mech-SM of [10], as described in Section 2,
on T ∈ arg maxX∈{S,A S} opt(X,B), directly implies a good solution. Since the resulting
randomized and deterministic mechanisms are very similar, we state them together for
succinctness.
Rand-Mech-SymSM(A, v, c, B) (resp. Det-Mech-SymSM(A, v, c, B))
1 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, 0) //find an exact local optimum
2 if opt(S,B) ≥ opt(A S,B) then
3 return Rand-Mech-SM(S, v, cS , B) (resp. Mech-SM(S, v, cS , B))
4 else
5 return Rand-Mech-SM(A S, v, cA S , B) (resp. Mech-SM(A S, v, cA S , B))
The next simple lemma is crucial for the performance of both mechanisms for arbitrary
submodular functions, and it shows how local search helps us exploit known results for
non-decreasing submodular functions. Its proof is similar in flavor to the proof of Lemma
3.1.
Lemma 4.1. Let A be a set and v be an arbitrary submodular function defined on 2A. If S
is a local maximum of v, then v is submodular and non-decreasing when restricted on 2S .
Proof. The fact that v is submodular when restricted on 2S is trivial. Suppose now that
the statement is not true and that v is not non-decreasing on 2S. That is, there exist
T, T ′ ⊆ S such that T ( T ′ and v(T ) > v(T ′). Let T ′ T = {i1, . . . , ir}.
By Theorem 2.2 we have
v(T ) ≤ v(T ′)−
∑
j∈[r]
(v(T ′)− v(T ′ {ij})) ,
and therefore ∑
j∈[r]
(v(T ′)− v(T ′ {ij})) ≤ v(T ′)− v(T ) < 0 .
We conclude that there is some ` ∈ [r] such that v(T ′) − v(T ′ {i`}) < 0. Then, by
submodularity and the fact that T ′ {i`} ⊆ S {i`}, we get
v(S)− v(S {i`}) ≤ v(T ′)− v(T ′ {i`}) < 0 .
But then v(S {i`}) > v(S), which contradicts the fact that S is a local maximum of v.
So, it must be the case that v is non-decreasing on the subsets of S.
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Since v is symmetric, if S is a local optimum, so is A S. Lemma 4.1 suggests that
we can use the mechanism Rand-Mech-SM (resp. Mech-SM) on S and A S, to get the
following implications.
Theorem 4.2. The mechanism Rand-Mech-SymSM is universally truthful, individually ra-
tional, budget-feasible, and has approximation ratio 10. The mechanism Det-Mech-SymSM
is deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, and has approximation ratio
6 + 2
√
6.
Proof. The fact that both mechanism Rand-Mech-SymSM and Det-Mech-SymSM are
budget-feasible follows from the budget-feasibility of Rand-Mech-SM and Mech-SM re-
spectively, established in [10].
For truthfulness and individual rationality, it suffices to show that the allocation rule
is monotone. Let us look first at Det-Mech-SymSM. Consider an agent i with true cost ci
in an instance I where i is included in the winning set. Note first that the local search step
is not affected by the costs, hence no player can influence the local optimum. Suppose
now that it was the case that opt(S,B) ≥ opt(A S,B), hence i ∈ S. If player i now
declares a lower cost, then the optimal solution within S can only get better, hence the
mechanism will run Mech-SM on S as before. Since Mech-SM is monotone, player i will
again be selected in the solution. We conclude that the outcome rule is monotone and
Det-Mech-SymSM is truthful.
To prove that the randomized mechanism Rand-Mech-SymSM is universally truthful
we use similar arguments. We fix the random bits of the mechanism and we consider a
winning agent i like before. Again, no player can influence the outcome of local search.
Suppose it is the case that opt(S,B) ≥ opt(A S,B), hence i ∈ S. If i declares a lower
cost, then the optimal solution within S improves, and Rand-Mech-SM will still run on
S. Since Rand-Mech-SM is universally truthful, it is monotone given the random bits,
and player i will again be a winner. We conclude that Rand-Mech-SymSM is universally
truthful.
To argue now about the approximation ratio, suppose that we are in the case that
opt(S,B) ≥ opt(A S,B) (the other case being symmetric). We know by Fact 3.2 that
opt(S,B) ≥ 0.5 · opt(A,B). Hence, since we run either Mech-SM or Rand-Mech-SM on S,
we will get twice their approximation ratio. This implies a ratio of 10 for Rand-Mech-SymSM
and a ratio of 6 + 2
√
6 for Det-Mech-SymSM.
Lower bounds on the approximability have been obtained by Chen et al. [10] for
additive valuations. Since additive functions are not symmetric, these lower bounds
do not directly apply here. However, it is not hard to construct symmetric submodular
functions that give the exact same bounds.
Lemma 4.3. Independent of complexity assumptions, there is no deterministic (resp.
randomized) truthful, budget feasible mechanism that can achieve an approximation ratio
better than 1 +
√
2 (resp. 2).
Proof. The lower bounds of [10] are both for additive objectives (Knapsack). It suffices
to show that given an instance (A, v, c, B) of Knapsack, we can construct an equivalent
(A′, v′, c′, B′) instance of Budgeted Max Weighted Cut. This is straightforward. Consider
a graph G with vertex set A ∪ x and edge set {(i, x) | i ∈ A}. For i ∈ A, vertex i has
cost c′i = ci, while vertex x has cost c′x = B + 1. Edge (i, x) has weight v(i). Finally, for
S ⊆ A ∪ x, v′(S) is equal to the weight of the cut defined by S.
This correspondence between items and vertices creates a natural correspondence
between solutions. It is clear that each feasible solution of the Knapsack instance
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essentially defines a feasible solution to the Budgeted Max Weighted Cut instance of the
same value and vice versa. In particular opt(A, v, c, B) = opt(A′, v′, c′, B). We conclude
that any lower bound for Knapsack gives a lower bound for Budgeted Max Weighted
Cut.
Clearly, both mechanisms presented in this section require superpolynomial time in
general (due to their first two lines), unless P = NP . In both cases, instead of opt(·, B)
we could use the optimal solution of a fractional relaxation of the problem, at the expense
of somewhat worse guarantees. This does not completely resolve the problem, although
this way local search becomes the sole bottleneck. For certain objectives, however, we can
achieve similar guarantees in polynomial time. Unweighted cut functions are the most
prominent such example, and it is the focus of the next subsection.
4.1 Polynomial Time Mechanisms for Unweighted Cut Functions
We begin with the definition of the problem when v is a cut function:
Budgeted Max Weighted Cut. Given a complete graph G with vertex set V (G) = [n],
non-negative weights wij on the edges, non-negative costs ci on the nodes, and a positive
budget B, find X ⊆ [n] so that v(X) = ∑i∈X∑j∈[n] X wij is maximized subject to∑
j∈X cj ≤ B.
For convenience, we assume the problem is defined on a complete graph as we can
use zero weights to model any graph. In this subsection, we focus on the unweighted
version, where all weights are equal to either 0 or 1. We call this special case Budgeted
Max Cut. The weighted version is considered in Subsection 5.1.
The fact that local search takes polynomial time to find an exact local optimum for the
unweighted version [21] does not suffice to make Rand-Mech-SymSM a polynomial time
mechanism, since one still needs to compute opt(S,B) and opt(A S,B). However, a small
modification so that Rand-Mech-SM(S,B) and Rand-Mech-SM(A S,B) are returned with
probability 1/2 each (see Appendix D) yields a randomized 10-approximate polynomial
time mechanism.
Rand-Mech-UCut(A, v, c, B)
1 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, 0) //find an exact local optimum
2 with probability 1/2 return Rand-Mech-SM(S, v, cS , B)
3 with probability 1/2 return Rand-Mech-SM(A S, v, cA S , B)
Theorem 4.4. Rand-Mech-UCut is a randomized, universally truthful, individually rational,
budget-feasible mechanism for Budgeted Max Cut that has approximation ratio 10 and runs
in polynomial time.
Proof. Clearly, for the unweighted version of Max Cut, the mechanism runs in polynomial
time. The fact that the mechanism is truthful, individually rational and budget feasible
follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Finally, let
XS = Greedy-SM(S, v, cS , B/2), XA S = Greedy-SM(A S, v, cA S , B/2),
iS ∈ arg max
{i∈S | ci≤B}
v(i), and iA S ∈ arg max
{i∈A S | ci≤B}
v(i) .
Since we run mechanism Rand-Mech-SM with probability 1/2 on S and A S, it is not
hard to see that each of XS and XA S is returned with probability 3/10, while each of iS
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and iA S is returned with probability 2/10. If X denotes the outcome of the mechanism,
then using subadditivity and Lemma 2.8, we get
E(v(X)) =
3
10
v(XS) +
2
10
v(iS) +
3
10
v(XA S) +
2
10
v(iA S)
≥ 1
10
opt(S,B) +
1
10
opt(A S,B)
≥ 1
10
opt(A,B) ,
thus establishing an approximation ratio of 10.
In order to design deterministic mechanisms that run in polynomial time, we first
optimize a deterministic mechanism of [3] to obtain Mech-SM-frac below, which is
applicable for non-decreasing submodular functions. The difference with Mech-SM from
Section 2, is that now we assume that a fractional relaxation of our problem can be
solved optimally and that the fractional optimal solution is within a constant of the
integral solution. To do this, we will consider a LP relaxation of an ILP formulation of
the problem, and also bound the solution, using pipage rounding. In particular, let
v(·) be a non-decreasing submodular function, A′ = {i ∈ A | ci ≤ B}, and consider a
relaxation of our problem for which we have an exact algorithm. Moreover, suppose that
optf (A′, v, cA′ , B) ≤ ρ · opt(A′, v, cA′ , B) = ρ · opt(A, v, c, B) for any instance, where optf
and opt denote the value of an optimal solution to the relaxed and the original problem
respectively.
Theorem 4.5 (inferred from [3] and Lemma D.2). Mech-SM-frac is deterministic, truthful,
individually rational, budget-feasible, and has approximation ratio ρ+ 2 +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1.
Also, it runs in polynomial time as long as the exact algorithm for the relaxed problem runs
in polynomial time.
Mech-SM-frac(A, v, c, B)
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 if
(
ρ+ 1 +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
· v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 return Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2)
Note that when the relaxed problem is the same as the original (ρ = 1), then Mech-SM-
frac becomes Mech-SM and the two approximation ratios coincide. A discussion on how
different results combine into Theorem 4.5 is deferred to Appendix C.
Hence, to obtain a deterministic mechanism for Budgeted Max Cut, we will use an
LP-based approach, and we will run Mech-SM-frac on an appropriate local maximum. For
this, we will first need to compare the value of an optimal solution of a fractional relaxation
to the value of an optimal solution of the original problem. Ageev and Sviridenko [1]
studied a different Max Cut variant, but we follow a similar approach to obtain the desired
bound for our problem as well. We begin with a linear program formulation of the problem.
Our analysis is carried out for the weighted version of the problem, as we are going to
reuse some results in Subsection 5.1, which deals with weighted cut functions. To be more
precise, we want to argue about a variant of the problem where we may only be allowed
to choose the solution from a specified subset of A. That is, we formulate below the
sub-instance I = (X, v, cX , B) of (A, v, c, B), where in fact X ⊆ A′ = {i ∈ A | ci ≤ B}.
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We associate a binary variable xi for each vertex i, and the partition of A = [n]
according to the value of the xis defines the cut. There is also a binary variable zij for
each edge {i, j} which is the indicator variable of whether {i, j} is in the cut.
maximize:
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n] [i]
wijzij (1)
subject to: zij ≤ xi + xj , ∀i ∈ [n],∀j ∈ [n] [i] (2)
zij ≤ 2− xi − xj , ∀i ∈ [n],∀j ∈ [n] [i] (3)∑
i∈[n]
cixi ≤ B (4)
xi = 0 , ∀i ∈ [n] X (5)
0 ≤ xi, zij ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ [n], ∀j ∈ [n] [i] (6)
xi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ [n] (7)
It is not hard to see that (1)-(7) is a natural ILP formulation for Budgeted Max Weighted
Cut and (1)-(6) is its linear relaxation. Let opt(I) and optf (I) denote the optimal solutions
to (1)-(7) and (1)-(6) respectively for instance I. To show how these two are related we
will use the technique of pipage rounding [1, 2]. Although we do not provide a general
description of the technique, the proof of the next theorem is self-contained (see Appendix
C).
Theorem 4.6. Given the fractional relaxation (1)-(6) for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut,
we have that optf (I) ≤ (2 + 2βI) · opt(I), for any instance I, where βI is such that
maxi∈A′ v(i) ≤ βI · opt(I).
Note that there always exists some βI ≤ 1 for every instance I, hence, the above
theorem implies a worst-case upper bound of 4. Now, we may modify Det-Mech-SymSM
to use optf instead of opt, and Mech-SM-frac instead of Mech-SM. This results in the
following deterministic mechanism that runs in polynomial time.
Det-Mech-UCut(A, v, c, B)
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 if 26.25 · v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, 0)
6 if optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B) then
7 return Mech-SM-frac(S, v, cS , B)
8 else
9 return Mech-SM-frac(A S, v, cA S , B)
Theorem 4.7. Det-Mech-UCut is a deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-
feasible mechanism for Budgeted Max Cut that has approximation ratio 27.25 and runs in
polynomial time.
Proof. Clearly the mechanism runs in polynomial time.
For truthfulness and individual rationality, it suffices to show that the allocation rule
is monotone, i.e., a winning agent j remains a winner if he decreases his cost to be c′j < cj .
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If j = i∗ and he wins in line 2, then his bid is irrelevant and he remains a winner. If
j 6= i∗, or j = i∗ but he wins after line 3, we may assume he wins at line 7 (the case of
line 9 is symmetric). When bidding c′j < cj , the decision of the mechanism in line 2 does
not change (if j 6= i∗ then optf is improved, if j = i∗ nothing changes). Further, since he
cannot influence the local search, j is still in S and Mech-SM-frac is executed. By the
monotonicity of Mech-SM-frac we have that j is still a winner. Therefore, the mechanism
is monotone.
If the winner is i∗ in line 3, then his payment is B. Otherwise, budget-feasibility follows
from the budget-feasibility of Mech-SM-frac and the observation that the comparison in
line 2 only gives additional upper bounds on the payments of winners from Mech-SM-frac.
It remains to prove the approximation ratio. We consider two cases. Let α = 26.25. If
i∗ is returned in line 3, then
α · v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A′ {i∗}, B) = opt(A {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A,B)− v(i∗) ,
and therefore opt(A,B) ≤ (α+ 1) · v(i∗) = 27.25 · v(i∗).
On the other hand, if X = Mech-SM-frac(S,B) is returned in line 7, then by Theorem
4.6 with factor 4 we have
α · v(i∗) < optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ 4 · opt(A′ {i∗}, B) = 4 · opt(A {i∗}, B) ≤ 4 · opt(A,B).
Therefore, v(i∗) < 4α opt(A,B) and for the remaining steps of the mechanism we can use
Theorem 4.6 with factor 2 + 8/α.
At line 6 it must be the case that optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B). Thus,(
2 +
8
α
)
opt(S,B) =
(
2 +
8
α
)
opt(S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B)
≥ opt(A′ S,B) = opt(A S,B) ≥ opt(A,B)− opt(S,B) .
Therefore opt(S,B) ≥ α3α+8 opt(A,B). By Theorem 4.5 we have(
4 + 8/α+
√
(2 + 8/α)2 + 32/α+ 9
)
v(X) ≥ opt(S,B) ≥ α
3α+ 8
opt(A,B) ,
and by substituting α and doing the calculations we get opt(A,B) ≤ 27.25 · v(X).
The case where X = Mech-SM-frac(A S,B) is returned in line 9 is symmetric to
the case above and it need not be considered separately. We conclude that opt(A,B) ≤
27.25 · Det-Mech-UCut(A,B).
5 Symmetric Submodular Objectives Revisited
Suppose that for a symmetric submodular function v, an optimal fractional solution can
be found efficiently and that optf (A′, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A,B) for any instance, where optf
and opt denote the value of an optimal solution to the relaxed and the original problem
respectively, and A′ = {i ∈ A | ci ≤ B}.
A natural question is whether the approach taken for unweighted cut functions can
be fruitful for other symmetric submodular objectives. In the mechanisms of Subsection
4.1, however, the complexity of local search can be a bottleneck even for objectives where
an optimal fractional solution can be found fast and it is not far from the optimal integral
solution. So, we now return to the idea of Section 3, where local search runs in polynomial
time and produces an approximate local maximum; unfortunately, the nice property of
monotonicity in each side of the partition (Lemma 4.1) does not hold any longer.
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This means that the approximation guarantees of such mechanisms do not follow in
any direct way from existing work. Moreover, budget-feasibility turns out to be an even
more delicate issue since it crucially depends on the (approximate) monotonicity of the
valuation function. Specifically, when a set X only contains a very poor solution to the
original problem, every existing proof of budget feasibility for the restriction of v on X
completely breaks down. Since we cannot expect that an approximate local maximum S
and its complement A S both contain a ‘‘good enough’’ solution to the original problem,
we need to make sure that Greedy-SM never runs on the wrong set.
The mechanism Det-Mech-UCut for the unweighted cut problem seems to take care
of this and we are going to build on it, in order to propose mechanisms for arbitrary
symmetric submodular functions. To do so we replace the constant 26.25 that appears in
Det-Mech-UCut by α = (1 + ρ)
(
2 + ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
− 1 and we find an approximate
local maximum instead of an exact local maximum. Most importantly, in order to achieve
budget-feasibility we introduce a modification of Mech-SM-frac (which we call Mech-SM-
frac-var, see Appendix D.2) that runs Greedy-SM with a slightly reduced budget. The
parameter ′ that appears in the description of the mechanism below is determined by the
analysis of the mechanism and only depends on the constants ρ and .
Det-Mech-SymSM-frac(A, v, c, B, )
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 if α · v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, ′)
6 if optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B) then
7 return Mech-SM-frac-var(S, v, cS , B, (1− (α1 + 2)′))
8 else
9 return Mech-SM-frac-var(A S, v, cA S , B, (1− (α1 + 2)′))
Theorem 5.1 below shows that for any objective for which we can establish a constant
upper bound ρ on the ratio of the fractional and the integral optimal solutions, we have
constant factor approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial-time .
Theorem 5.1. For any  > 0, Det-Mech-SymSM-frac is a deterministic, truthful, individu-
ally rational, budget-feasible mechanism for symmetric submodular valuations, that has
approximation ratio α+ 1 +  and runs in polynomial time.
Appendix D is mostly dedicated to the proof of the theorem. We view Theorem 5.1 as
the most technically demanding result of this work. There are several steps involved in
the proof, since we need the good properties of Greedy-SM to still hold even for objectives
that are not exactly non-decreasing.
5.1 Weighted Cut Functions
Let us return now to the Max Cut problem, and consider the weighted version. An
immediate implication of Theorem 5.1 is that we get a deterministic polynomial-time
mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut with approximation ratio 58.72. This is just
the result of substituting ρ = 4, as suggested by Theorem 4.6, in the formula for α.
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Corollary 5.2. There is a deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible
mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut that has approximation ratio 58.72 and runs in
polynomial time.
However, Theorem 4.6 says something stronger: given that maxi∈A′ v(i) is small
compared to opt(A,B), ρ is strictly smaller than 4. Note that the first step in Det-Mech-
SymSM-frac is to compare maxi∈A′ v(i) to optf (A′ {i∗}, B). This implies an upper bound
on maxi∈A′ v(i) in the following steps and we can use it to further fine-tune our mechanism.
In particular, by setting α = 26.245 instead of (1 + 4)
(
2 + 4 +
√
16 + 16 + 1
)− 1 = 57.72
in Det-Mech-SymSM-frac, we prove in Appendix D.2 the following improved result that
matches the approximation guarantee for unweighted cut functions.
Theorem 5.3. There is a deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible
mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut that has approximation ratio 27.25, and runs
in polynomial time.
6 An Improved Upper Bound for XOS Objectives
In [6] a randomized, universally truthful and budget-feasible 768-approximation mecha-
nism was introduced for XOS functions. For several of the results in Sections 4 and 5 the
best previously known upper bound follows from this result (see also Remark 2.9). In this
section we slightly modify their mechanism to improve its performance.4 Although there is
not much novelty in this result, it feels appropriate to provide this tighter analysis, given
that the factor of 768 has been the benchmark against which our results are presented.
We begin with the definition of XOS functions.
Definition 6.1. A valuation function, defined on 2A for some set A, is XOS or fractionally
subadditive, if there exist non-negative additive functions α1, α2, ..., αr, for some finite r,
such that v(S) = max{α1(S), α2(S), ..., αr(S)}.
Note that above we define non-decreasing XOS functions, and everything is stated and
proved for those. However, there is a relatively straightforward way to extend any result
to general XOS functions (as defined in [17]); see Remark 2.9 and Appendix A.2.
Below we provide the mechanism Main-XOS. Our mechanism has the same structure
as the one presented in [6] but we tune its parameters and perform a slightly different
analysis in order to improve the approximation factor. The mechanism Additive-Mechanism
of [10] for additive valuation functions is used as a subroutine. Additive-Mechanism is a
universally truthful, 3-approximate mechanism (see Theorem B.2 in [10]). Initially, we
revisit the random sampling part of the mechanism and modify the threshold bound of
line 2:
Sample-XOS
1 Pick each item independently at random with probability 12 to form a set T
2 Compute opt(T, v, cT , B) and set a threshold t = opt(T,v,cT ,B)4.6B
3 Find a set S∗ ∈ arg maxS⊆A T {v(S)− t · c(S)}
4 Find an additive function α in the XOS representation of v(·) with α(S∗) = v(S∗)
5 return Additive-Mechanism(S∗, α, cS∗ , B)
4In a recent manuscript, Leonardi et al. [25] also suggest a fine-tuning of this mechanism that yields a
factor 436.
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This part is used as one of the two alternatives of the main mechanism. We modify
the probabilities with which the two outcomes occur:
Main-XOS
1 With probability p = 0.08, pick a most valuable item as the only winner and pay him
B
2 With probability 1− p, run Sample-XOS
By following a similar but more careful analysis, we improve the approximation ratio
by a factor of 3 while also retaining its properties. Notice that like the mechanism of [6],
Main-XOS is randomized and has superpolynomial running time. In particular, it requires
a demand oracle.
Theorem 6.2. Main-XOS is universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, and
has approximation ratio 244.
Proof. Universal truthfulness, individual rationality and budget feasibility follow directly
from the proof of Theorem 3.1 of [6]. We next prove the approximation ratio of the
mechanism. Let i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A v(i) and XS be the output of Sample-XOS. In addition,
let X be an optimal solution, i.e., a subset of A such that v(X) = opt(A, v, c, B) and
c(X) ≤ B. We need the following two lemmata:
Lemma 6.3 (Claim 3.1 in [6]). For any S ⊆ S∗, α(S)− t · c(S) ≥ 0.
Lemma 6.4 (Lemma 2.1 in [6]). Consider any subadditive function v(·). For any given
subset S ⊆ A and a positive integer k assume that v(S) ≥ k · v(i) for any i ∈ S. Further,
suppose that S is divided uniformly at random into two groups T1 and T2. Then with
probability at least 12 , we have that v(T1) ≥ k−14k v(S) and v(T2) ≥ k−14k v(S).
Let κ = 74. We are going to use κ to set different values for k in Lemma 6.4 for different
cases. We follow a similar analysis as [6], but since we use two different values for k,
things get a little more complicated. Let XM to be the output of Main-XOS. We have the
following three case regarding the value of item i∗:
1. v(i∗) > 3.8κ opt(A, v, c, B). In this case we have that
E(v(XM )) = p · v(i∗) + (1− p) · E(v(XS)) ≥ p · v(i∗) ≥ p3.8
κ
opt(A, v, c, B) ,
and thus, opt(A, v, c, B) ≤ 243.5 · E(v(XM )).
2. 1κ opt(A, v, c, B) < v(i
∗) ≤ 3.8κ opt(A, v, c, B). Note that now we can apply Lemma 6.4
with k = κ3.8 . We split this case into two subcases:
• c(S∗) > B. Since c(S∗) is more than B we can find a subset S′ ⊆ S∗, such that
B
2 ≤ c(S′) ≤ B. By Lemma 6.3 we have
α(S′) ≥ t · c(S′) ≥ opt(T, v, cT , B)
4.6 ·B ·
B
2
≥ opt(T, v, cT , B)
9.2
.
By using Lemma 6.4 we have
opt(T, v, cT , B) ≥ opt(T ∩X, v, cT∩X , B) ≥ κ− 3.8
4κ
opt(X, v, cX , B)
=
κ− 3.8
4κ
opt(A, v, c, B) .
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Since opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) is the value of an optimal solution and S′ a particular
solution under budget constraint B, we conclude that
opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) ≥ α(S′) ≥ opt(T, v, cT , B)
9.2
≥ (κ− 3.8)
36.8 · κ opt(A, v, c, B) ,
with probability at least 12 .
• c(S∗) ≤ B. In this case we have that
α(S∗) = opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) = opt(S∗, v, cS∗ , B) = v(S∗) .
Let S′ = X T . We have c(S′) ≤ c(X) ≤ B and also, by using Lemma 6.4,
v(S′) ≥ κ−3.84κ opt(A, v, c, B) with probability of at least 12 . Then, we have
opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) = v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗)− t · c(S∗) ≥ v(S′)− t · c(S′)
≥ κ− 3.8
4κ
opt(A, v, c, B)− opt(T, v, cT , B)
4.6 ·B ·B
≥
(
κ− 3.8
4κ
− 1
4.6
)
opt(A, v, c, B) ,
with probability at least 12 .
By substituting κ, it is easy to see that κ−3.84κ − 14.6 < (κ−3.8)36.8·κ . So, in both cases we have
that opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) ≥
(
κ−3.8
4κ − 14.6
)
opt(A, v, c, B) with probability at least 12 . Now
recall that Additive-Mechanism has an approximation factor of at most 3 with respect
to opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B). So we can finally derive that
E(v(XS)) ≥ 1
3
opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) ≥ 1
3
· 1
2
·
(
κ− 3.8
4κ
− 1
4.6
)
· opt(A, v, c, B) .
Thus the solution that Main-XOS returns has expected value
E(v(XM )) = p · v(i∗) + (1− p) · E(v(XS))
≥ p
κ
· opt(A, v, c, B) + (1− p)
6
·
(
κ− 3.8
4κ
− 1
4.6
)
· opt(A, v, c, B) .
By substituting the values for p, κ we get opt(A, v, c, B) ≤ 243.2 · E(v(XM )).
3. v(i∗) ≤ 1κ opt(A, v, c, B). The analysis of case 2 holds here as well, so we omit the
details. The only difference is that now Lemma 6.4 should be applied with k = κ.
The subcase where c(S∗) > B gives opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) ≥ (κ−1)36.8·κ opt(A, v, c, B) with
probability at least 12 , while the subcase where c(S
∗) ≤ B gives opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) ≥(
κ−1
4κ − 14.6
)
opt(A, v, c, B) with probability at least 12 . By substituting κ, we see that
(κ−1)
36.8·κ <
κ−1
4κ − 14.6 . So, in both cases we have that opt(S∗, α, cS∗ , B) ≥ (κ−1)36.8·κ opt(A, v, c, B)
with probability at least 12 . The above analysis gives that the solution returned by
Main-XOS has expected value
E(v(XM )) ≥ (1− p)
6
· (κ− 1)
36.8 · κ · opt(A, v, c, B) .
By substituting the values for p, κ we get opt(A, v, c, B) ≤ 243.3 · E(v(XM )).
We conclude that opt(A, v, c, B) ≤ 244 · E(v(XM )).
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7 Conclusions
In this work, we have made progress on the design of budget-feasible mechanisms
for symmetric submodular objectives. The highlights of our results are polynomial
time algorithms for the Budgeted Max Cut problem (weighted and unweighted) with
significant improvements over previously known approximation factors. Although for
general symmetric submodular functions we have exponential running times, the results
imply polynomial time algorithms for any objective, where we can bound the optimal
fractional solution with respect to the integral one. These results make further progress
on the questions posed by [12]. It remains an open problem however, whether any of
these approximation ratios are tight. Regarding our techniques, we expect that the idea
of utilizing local search in order to identify monotone regions of a general submodular
function may have further applications on mechanism design. Finally, apart from
the mechanism design problem, the algorithmic result of Section 3 is an interesting
consequence for submodular optimization.
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A Missing Material from Section 2
A.1 Instances with Costs Exceeding the Budget
Consider an instance with a symmetric submodular function, where there exist agents
with ci > B. It may seem at first sight that we could just discard such agents, since too
expensive agents are not included in any feasible solution anyway. However, the presence
of such agents can create infeasible solutions of very high value and make an analog of
Lemma 3.1 impossible to prove. Simply discarding them could also destroy the symmetry
of the function (e.g., if we had a cut function defined on a graph, we could not just remove
a node).
Let I denote the set of all instances of the problem with symmetric submodular
functions, and let J denote the set of all instances where at most one agent has cost
more than B. Given X ⊆ A, we let c(X) = ∑i∈X ci. The next lemma, together with its
corollary, show that, when dealing with symmetric submodular functions, we may only
consider instances in J without any loss of generality.
Lemma A.1. Given an instance I = (A, v, c, B) ∈ I, we can efficiently construct an
instance J = (A′, v′, c′, B) ∈ J such that
• Every feasible solution of I is a feasible solution of J and vice versa.
• If X is a feasible solution of I, then v(X) = v′(X) and c(X) = c′(X). In particular,
opt(J) = opt(I).
Proof. LetE = {i ∈ A | ci > B} be the set of expensive agents and defineA′ = (A E)∪{iE},
where iE is a new agent replacing the whole set E. For i ∈ A E we define c′i = ci, while
c′iE = B + 1. Finally, v
′ is defined as follows
v′(T ) =
{
v(T ) , if T ⊆ A E
v((T {iE}) ∪ E) , otherwise
Now suppose X is a budget-feasible solution of I. Then c(X) ≤ B and thus X ⊆ A E.
But then, by the definition of c′, c′(X) = c(X) ≤ B as well, and therefore X is also a
budget-feasible solution of J . Moreover, v′(X) = v(X) by the definition of v′. We conclude
that opt(I) ≤ opt(J).
The proof that every feasible solution of J is a feasible solution of I is almost identical.
This implies opt(J) ≤ opt(I), and therefore opt(J) = opt(I).
Now, it is not hard to see that we can turn any algorithmic result on J to the same
algorithmic result on I. However, we need a somewhat stronger statement to take care
of issues like truthfulness and budget-feasibility. This is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary A.2. Given a (polynomial time) algorithm alg′ that achieves a ρ-approximation on
instances in J , we can efficiently construct a (polynomial time) ρ-approximation algorithm
alg that works for all instances in I. Moreover, if alg′ is monotone and budget-feasible
on instances in J , assuming Myerson’s threshold payments, then alg is monotone and
budget-feasible on instances in I.
Proof. The description of alg is quite straightforward. Given an instance I = (A, v, c, B) ∈
I, alg first constructs instance J = (A′, v′, c′, B) ∈ J , as described in the proof of Lemma
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A.1. Then alg runs alg′ with input J and returns its output. Clearly, if alg′ runs in
polynomial time, so does alg.
If X = alg′(J) = alg(I), then X is feasible with respect to J and opt(J) ≤ ρ · v′(X).
By Lemma A.1 we get thatX is feasible with respect to I and opt(I) = opt(J) ≤ ρ ·v′(X) =
ρ · v(X). This establishes the approximation ratio of alg.
Next, assume that alg′ is monotone and—assuming Myerson’s threshold payments—
budget-feasible on instances in J . Suppose that agent j ∈ alg(I) reduces his cost from
cj to bj < cj . This results in a new instance I∗ = (A, v, (bj , c−j), B) ∈ I. Since it must be
the case where cj ≤ B, the corresponding instance of J is J∗ = (A′, v′, (bj , c′−j), B). Due
to the monotonicity of alg′ we have
j ∈ alg(I) = alg′(J)⇒ j ∈ alg′(J∗) = alg(I∗) ,
and therefore alg is monotone as well.
The budget-feasibility of alg follows from the budget-feasibility of alg′ by observing
that i ∈ alg(A, v, (bj , c−j), B) if and only if i ∈ alg′(A′, v′, (bj , c−j), B) for all i ∈ A′.
A.2 Regarding Remark 2.9
We use the cut function on a very simple graph and show that although v is submodular,
vˆ is not. Consider the following graph where each edge has unit weight:
a b 
c d 
We compute the value of the following sets:
vˆ({a}) = v({a}) = 2
vˆ({a, b}) = v({a}) = 2
vˆ({a, c}) = v({a}) = v({c}) = v({a, c}) = 2
vˆ({a, b, c}) = v({b, c}) = 3
Now it is easy to see that although {a} ⊆ {a, c} we have vˆ({a} ∪ {b})− vˆ({a}) = 0 < 1 =
vˆ({a, c} ∪ {b})− vˆ({a, c}).
So an interesting question is if vˆ can be classified when v is submodular. In [17] the
general XOS class was introduced, where it is allowed for a function to be non-monotone
(recall here that the XOS class contains only non-decreasing functions by definition). They
proved that when v is general XOS then vˆ is XOS, while in addition they observed that the
class of non-negative submodular functions is a strict subset of the general XOS class.
Thus since any non-negative submodular function v is also general XOS we conclude vˆ is
XOS.
B Proof of Theorem 3.4
To facilitate the exposition of the analysis, we restate algorithm Greedy-Enum-SM, so that
instead of the set variable T , we have a variable St that describes the set constructed at
iteration t.
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Var-Greedy-Enum-SM(A, v, c, B)
1 Let S1 be the best feasible solution of cardinality at most 3 (by enumerating them
all)
2 S2 = ∅
3 for every U ⊆ A with |U | = 3 do
4 S0 = U, t = 1, A0 = A U
5 while At−1 6= ∅ do
6 Find θt = max
i∈At−1
v(St−1 ∪ {i})− v(St−1)
ci
, and let it be an element of At−1
that attains θt
7 if θt ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈St−1∪{it} ci ≤ B then
8 St = St−1 ∪ {it}
9 else
10 St = St−1
11 At = At−1 {it}
12 t = t+ 1
13 if v(St−1) > v(S2) then
14 S2 = S
t−1
15 return S ∈ arg max
X∈{S1,S2}
v(X)
Recall that Var-Greedy-Enum-SM runs on both S and A S and LS-Greedy returns the
best solution of these two. We may assume, without loss of generality that opt(S,B) =
max{opt(S,B), opt(A S,B)} (the case for A S being symmetric). By Fact 3.2 we have
opt(S,B) ≥ 0.5 opt(A,B). So, it suffices to show that running Var-Greedy-Enum-SM on
S outputs a set of value at least (1− 1/e− ) opt(S,B).
In what follows we analyze the approximation ratio achieved by Var-Greedy-Enum-
SM(S, v, c, B) with respect to opt(S,B). For this, we follow closely the proof of the main
result in [33].
If there is an optimal solution for our problem restricted on S, of cardinality one, two
or three, then the set S1 of Var-Greedy-Enum-SM will be such a solution. Hence, assume
that the cardinality of any optimal solution is at least four and let S∗ be such a solution.
If necessary, reorder the elements of S∗ = {j1, . . . , j|S∗|} so that j1 = arg max` v({j`}),
and jk+1 = arg max`>k [v({j1, . . . , jk, j`})− v({j1, . . . , jk})].
Let Y = {j1, j2, j3}. For notational convenience, we will use the function g(·) =
v(·) − v(Y ). It is straightforward that g(·) is submodular. Moreover, the following fact
follows from [33].
Fact B.1. g(X ∪ {i})− g(X) ≤ 13v(Y ), for any Y ⊆ X ⊆ S and i ∈ S∗ X.
Consider the execution of the greedy algorithm with initial set U = Y . Let t∗ + 1 be
the first time when an element it∗+1 ∈ S∗ is not added to St∗ . In fact, we assume that
t∗ + 1 is the first time when St = St−1. (To see that this is without loss of generality, if
there is some time τ < t∗ + 1 such that iτ is not added to Sτ−1, then—by the definition
of t∗ + 1—it must be the case that iτ /∈ S∗. But then, we may consider the instance
(S {iτ}, v, cS {iτ}, B) instead. We have v(S∗) = opt(S {iτ}, B) = opt(S,B) and the
greedy solution constructed in the iteration where S0 = Y is exactly the same as before.)
We are going to distinguish two cases.
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Case 1. For all t ∈ [t∗], θt ≥ 0, but θt∗+1 < 0. Using Theorem 2.2 for S∗ and St∗ we have
g(S∗) ≤ g(St∗) +
∑
i∈S∗ St∗
(g(St
∗ ∪ {i})− g(St∗))−
∑
i∈St∗ S∗
(g(St
∗ ∪ S∗)− g(St∗ ∪ S∗ {i}))
= g(St
∗
) +
∑
i∈S∗ St∗
(v(St
∗ ∪ {i})− v(St∗))−
∑
i∈St∗ S∗
(v(St
∗ ∪ S∗)− v(St∗ ∪ S∗ {i}))
≤ g(St∗) +
∑
i∈S∗ St∗
ciθt∗+1 − |St∗ S∗|
(
− 
n
opt(S,B)
)
≤ g(St∗) +  opt(S,B) ,
Here, the second to last inequality holds by Lemma 3.1 and by the assumptions we have
made. That is, for every i ∈ S∗ St∗ , we have that i ∈ At∗ , since we assumed that t∗ + 1 is
the first time when St = St−1, hence up until time t∗, At∗ contains all the agents apart
from St∗ . This implies that for every i ∈ S∗ St∗ , we have that v(St∗∪{i})−v(St∗) ≤ ciθt∗+1,
by the definition of θt∗+1.
Therefore, we can conclude that
v(St
∗
) = v(Y ) + g(St
∗
) ≥ v(Y ) + g(S∗)−  opt(S,B) = (1− ) opt(S,B) .
Case 2. For all t ∈ [t∗ + 1], θt ≥ 0, but
∑
i∈St∗∪{it∗+1} ci > B while
∑
i∈St∗ ci ≤ B. Using
Theorem 2.2 for S∗ and each of St, t ∈ [t∗], as well as Lemma 3.1, we have
g(S∗) ≤ g(St) +
∑
i∈S∗ St
(g(St ∪ {i})− g(St))−
∑
i∈St S∗
(g(St ∪ S∗)− g(St ∪ S∗ {i}))
= g(St) +
∑
i∈S∗ St
(v(St ∪ {i})− v(St))−
∑
i∈St S∗
(v(St ∪ S∗)− v(St ∪ S∗ {i}))
≤ g(St) +
∑
i∈S∗ St
(v(St ∪ {i})− v(St))− |St S∗|
(
− 
n
opt(S,B)
)
≤ g(St) +
∑
i∈S∗ St
(v(St ∪ {i})− v(St)) +  opt(S,B) ,
and therefore
g(S∗)−  opt(S,B) ≤ g(St) +
∑
i∈S∗ St
(v(St ∪ {i})− v(St))
≤ g(St) +
∑
i∈S∗ St
ciθt+1
≤ g(St) +
(
B −
∑
i∈Y
ci
)
θt+1 ,
for all t ∈ [t∗].
For the last part of the proof we need the following inequality of Wolsey [34].
Theorem B.2 (Wolsey [34]). Let k and s be arbitrary positive integers, and ρ1, . . . , ρk
be arbitrary reals with z1 =
∑k
i=1 ρi and z2 = mint∈[k]
(∑t−1
i=1 ρi + sρt
)
> 0. Then
z1/z2 ≥ 1− (1− 1/s)k ≥ 1− e− ks .
For any τ , defineBτ =
∑τ
t=1 cit , and let k = Bt∗+1 and s = B−
∑
i∈Y ci. We also define
ρ1, . . . , ρk as follows; for i ≤ c1, ρi = θ1 and for Bτ < i ≤ Bτ+1, ρi = θτ+1. It is easy to see
that g(St∗∪{it∗+1}) =
∑t∗+1
t=1 citθit =
∑k
i=1 ρi and similarly g(St) =
∑τ
t=1 citθit =
∑Bτ
i=1 ρi.
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As noted in [33], since the ρis are nonnegative we have
min
t∈[k]
(
t−1∑
i=1
ρi + sρt
)
= min
τ∈[t∗]
(
Bτ∑
i=1
ρi + sρBτ+1
)
,
and therefore
g(S∗)−  opt(S,B) ≤ min
t∈[k]
(
t−1∑
i=1
ρi + sρt
)
.
So, as a direct application of Theorem B.2 we have
g(St
∗ ∪ {it∗+1})
g(S∗)−  opt(S,B) ≥ 1− e
− k
s > 1− e−1 .
Finally, using the above inequality and Fact B.1, we get
v(St
∗
) = v(Y ) + g(St
∗
) = v(Y ) + g(St
∗ ∪ {it∗+1})− (g(St∗ ∪ {it∗+1})− g(St∗))
≥ v(Y ) + (1− e−1)g(S∗)− (1− e−1) opt(S,B)− (v(St∗ ∪ {it∗+1})− v(St∗))
≥ v(Y ) + (1− e−1)g(S∗)−  opt(S,B)− 1
3
v(Y )
≥ (1− e−1 − ) opt(S,B) .
Since in both cases the final output T ∗ of the algorithm has value at least v(St∗), this
implies that
v(T ∗) ≥ (1− e−1 − ) opt(S,B) ≥ 1− e
−1 − 
2
opt(A,B) >
(e− 1
2e
− 
)
opt(A,B) ,
thus concluding the analysis of the performance of the algorithm.
C Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Monotonicity (and therefore truthfulness and individual rationality)
and budget-feasibility of the mechanism directly follow from [10] and [3]. Next we show
the approximation guarantee. As with the proof of Theorem 2.7, Lemma 2.8 is crucial.
Let S denote the outcome of Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2). We also consider two cases. Let
α = ρ+ 1 +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1.
• If i∗ is returned, then α · v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A′ {i∗}, B) = opt(A
{i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A,B)− v(i∗), and therefore opt(A,B) ≤ (α+ 1) · v(i∗).
• On the other hand, if S is returned, then α · v(i∗) < optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A′
{i∗}, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A,B). Combining this with Lemma 2.8 we have opt(A,B) ≤
3 · v(S) + 2ρα opt(A,B) and therefore opt(A,B) ≤ 3αα−2ρ · v(S) = (α+ 1) · v(S), where
the last equality is only a matter of calculations.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. The proof takes the same approach as the proof of Lemma 3 from
[3]. We begin with a nonlinear program such that if all the xis are integral then the
objectives (1) and (8) have the same value.
maximize: F (x) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n] [i]
wij(xi + xj − 2xixj) (8)
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subject to:
∑
i∈[n]
cixi ≤ B (9)
xi = 0 , ∀i ∈ [n] X (10)
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ [n] (11)
So, if x is any feasible integral vector to our problem, we have F (x) ≤ opt(I). Moreover,
given any feasible solution x, z to (1)-(6), the value of (1) is upper bounded by L(x) =∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n] [i]wij min{xi + xj , 2− xi− xj}, since zij ≤ min{xi + xj , 2− xi− xj} for any
i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n] [i].
Next, we show that F (x) ≥ 0.5L(x). This follows from the inequality
2(a+ b− 2ab) ≥ min{a+ b, 2− a− b} for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] ,
proven by Ageev and Sviridenko [1]. For completeness we prove it here as well. Notice that
by replacing a and b by 1− a and 1− b respectively both sides of the inequality remain
exactly the same. Therefore, it suffices to prove 2(a+ b− 2ab) ≥ a+ b for any a, b ∈ [0, 1]
such that a + b ≤ 1 (since otherwise, 1 − a + 1 − b ≤ 1). This however is equivalent to
a+ b ≥ 4ab which is true since a+ b ≥ (a+ b)2 ≥ 4ab.
Hence, if x∗, z∗ is an optimal fractional solution to (1)-(6), then the value of (1) is
optf (I) = L(x∗) and thus F (x∗) ≥ 0.5L(x∗) = 0.5 optf (I). However, x∗ may have several
fractional coordinates. Our next step is to transform x∗ to a vector x′ that has at most
one fractional coordinate and at the same time F (x′) ≥ F (x∗). To this end, we show how
to reduce the fractional coordinates by (at least) one in any feasible vector with at least
two such coordinates.
Consider a feasible vector x, and suppose xi and xj are two non integral coordinates.
Note that i, j ∈ X. Let xi,j be the vector we get if we replace xi by xi+ and xj by xj−ci/cj
and leave every other coordinate of x the same. Note that the function F¯ () = F (xi,j ), with
respect to , is either linear or a polynomial of degree 2 with positive leading coefficient.
That is, F¯ () is convex.
Notice now that xi,j always satisfies the budget constraint (9), and also satisfies (11)
as long as  ∈ [max {−xi, (xj − 1)cj/ci} ,min {1− xi, xjcj/ci}]. Due to convexity, F¯ ()
attains a maximum on one of the endpoints of this interval, say at ∗. Moreover, at either
endpoint at least one of xi + ∗ and xj − ∗ci/cj is integral. That is, xi,j∗ has at least one
more integral coordinate than x and F (xi,j∗ ) ≥ F (x).
So, initially x← x∗. As long as there exist two non integral coordinates xi and xj we
set x← xi,j∗ as described above. This happens at most n− 1 times, and outputs a feasible
vector x′ with at most one non-integral coordinate, and with F (x′) ≥ F (x∗). We have
then the following implications:
optf (I) = L(x
∗) ≤ 2 · F (x∗) ≤ 2 · F (x′) . (12)
If x′ is integral, then by (12) we have optf (I) ≤ 2 ·F (x′) ≤ 2 · opt(I), and we are done. So,
suppose that x′r is the only fractional coordinate of x′. Let x0 and x1 be the vectors we get
if we set x′r to 0 or 1 respectively and leave every other coordinate of x′ the same. Notice
that for a, b ∈ [0, 1] the inequality (1− a)(b− 1) ≤ 0 implies a+ b− ab ≤ 1 and therefore
a+ b− 2ab ≤ 1, so we have
F (x′)− F (x0) =
∑
j∈[n] r
wrj(x
′
r − 2x′rx′j)
≤
∑
j∈[n] r
wrj(x
′
r + x
′
j − 2x′rx′j)
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≤
∑
j∈[n] r
wrj = F (x
1 − x0) ,
and thus
F (x′) ≤ F (x0) + F (x1 − x0) . (13)
Combining (12)and (13), we have
optf (I) ≤ 2 · F (x′) ≤ 2 ·
(
F (x0) + F (x1 − x0)) ,
Using the fact that F is upper bounded by opt(I) on integral vectors, we have that
F (x0) ≤ opt(I). Observe now also that F (x1 − x0) = ∑j∈[n] r wrj = v(r) ≤ βI opt(I), by
the definition of βI . Hence, overall we get
optf (I) ≤ (2 + 2βI) opt(I) ,
thus completing the proof.
D Missing Material from Section 5
D.1 Going Beyond Non-Decreasing Objectives
Here we pave the way for the main results of Section 5, and therefore we need to prove
that certain mechanisms work even for objectives that are not exactly non-decreasing. To
make this precise, given a ground set A, a budget B and a constant  ≥ 0, we say that
a set function v is (B, )-quasi-monotone (or just quasi-monotone) on a set X ⊆ A if for
every T ( X and every i ∈ X T , we have v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≥ − n opt(X,B). Clearly,
(B, 0)-quasi-monotone on X just means non-decreasing on X.
The main lemmas needed for our proofs are about Greedy-SM, as it all boils down to
the monotonicity, budget-feasibility, and approximation ratio of this simple mechanism.
As mentioned in Lemma 2.6, Greedy-SM is monotone, since any item out of the winning
set remains out of the winning set if it increases its cost.
Lemma D.1. Suppose v is a (B, )-quasi-monotone submodular function on A such that
U · v(S) ≥ opt(A,B), where S is the set output by Greedy-SM(A, v, c, (1− U)B/2) and
U is a constant.5 Assuming the payments of Myerson’s lemma, S is budget-feasible.
Proof. Recall that before the description of Greedy-SM we assumed—without loss of
generality—that agents are sorted in descending order with respect to their ratio of
marginal value over cost, i.e., 1 = arg maxj∈A
v(j)
cj
and i = arg maxj∈A\[i−1]
v([j])−v([j−1])
cj
for i ≥ 2. Suppose that S = [`], i.e., 1, 2, . . . , ` are added in S in that order. Let
S0 = ∅ = [0] and Si = [i] for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. We are going to show that the payment to agent
i is upper bounded by B·(v([i])−v([i−1])v(S) , and then budget feasibility directly follows from∑
i∈[`]
B·(v([i])−v([i−1])
v(S) = B.
Suppose this upper bound does not hold for every agent. That is, there exists some
j ∈ [`] such that agent j bids bj > B·(v([j])−v([j−1]))v(S) and is still included in the output S′
of Greedy-SM(A, v, (c−j , bj), (1− U)B/2). Let b = (c−j , bj) and notice that up to agent
j − 1, agents are added to S′ in the same order as they do in S, but after that the ordering
5Typically, in our case, U is a constant associated with the constant ρ that determines how the optimal
solution to the relaxed problem is bounded by the optimal solution to the original problem. In particular,
throughout this work, U is upper bounded by (1 + ρ)
(
2 + ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
+ 1.
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might be affected. Also for i ∈ [`] we have v([i])−v([i−1])ci ≥
v([`])−v([`−1])
c`
≥ 2·v([`])(1−U)B and
therefore
b(S {j}) = c(S {j}) ≤ c(S) =
∑
i∈[`]
ci ≤ (1− U)B
2 · v([`])
∑
i∈[`]
(v([i])− v([i− 1]) = (1− U)B
2
.
For Greedy-SM(A, v, (c−j , bj), (1− U)B/2) let S′j−1 be the chosen set right before j
is added and S′j = S′j−1 ∪ {j}. This implies
j ∈ arg max
i∈[n]
v(S′j−1 ∪ {i})− v(S′j−1)
bi
and
v(S′j)− v(S′j−1)
bj
≥ 2 · v(S
′
j)
(1− U)B .
By Theorem 2.2 we have
v(S)− v(S′j) ≤
∑
i∈S S′j
(v(S′j ∪ {i})− v(S′j))−
∑
i∈S′j S
(v(S′j ∪ S)− v(S′j ∪ S {i}))
≤
∑
i∈S S′j
(v(S′j ∪ {i})− v(S′j))− |S′j S|
(
− 
n
opt(A,B)
)
≤
∑
i∈S S′j
(v(S′j ∪ {i})− v(S′j)) + Uv(S) .
If S S′j = ∅ then we directly get v(S′j) ≥ (1− U)v(S), otherwise we have
(1− U)v(S)− v(S′j) ≤
∑
i∈S S′j
bi ·
v(S′j ∪ {i})− v(S′j)
bi
≤ max
i∈S S′j
v(S′j ∪ {i})− v(S′j)
bi
·
∑
i∈S S′j
bi
≤ max
i∈[n]
v(S′j ∪ {i})− v(S′j)
bi
· b(S S′j)
≤ max
i∈[n]
v(S′j−1 ∪ {i})− v(S′j−1)
bi
· b(S {j})
≤ v(S
′
j−1 ∪ {j})− v(S′j−1)
bj
· (1− U)B
2
≤ v(Sj−1 ∪ {j})− v(Sj−1)
bj
· (1− U)B
2
≤ v(S)
B
· (1− U)B
2
=
(1− U)v(S)
2
,
where the last inequality follows from the choice of bj, while the next to last inequality
follows from submodularity as [j − 1] = Sj−1 ⊆ S′j−1. Therefore, v(S′j) ≥ (1/2 − U +
U/2)v(S).
In any case, we have v(S′j) ≥ (1/2− U/2)v(S) and thus
v(Sj)− v(Sj−1)
bj
≥ v(S
′
j)− v(S′j−1)
bj
≥ 2v(S
′
j)
(1− U)B ≥
2(1/2− U/2)v(S)
(1− U)B ≥
v(S)
B
,
which contradicts our assumption about bj .
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Lemma D.2. Suppose v is a (B, )-quasi-monotone submodular function on A. Let S
be the set output by Greedy-SM(A, v, c, βB) and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈{j∈A | cj≤B} v(i). Then
opt(A,B) ≤ 11−
(
1+β
β v(S) +
1
β v(i
∗)
)
.
Proof. Like in the proof of Lemma D.1 we assume that agents are sorted in descending
order with respect to their ratio of marginal value over cost, and that S = [`]. Let S∗ be
an optimal budget-feasible solution, i.e., v(S∗) = opt(A,B). By Theorem 2.2 we have
v(S∗)− v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S∗ S
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))−
∑
i∈S S∗
(v(S ∪ S∗)− v(S ∪ S∗ {i}))
≤
∑
i∈S∗ S
ci · v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
ci
− |S S∗|
(
− 
n
opt(A,B)
)
≤ max
i∈S∗ S
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
ci
·
∑
i∈S∗ S
ci + v(S
∗)
=
v(S ∪ {`+ 1})− v(S)
c`+1
· c(S∗ S) + v(S∗)
≤ v(S ∪ {`+ 1})
βB
· c(S∗) + v(S∗) ≤ v(S ∪ {`+ 1})
β
+ v(S∗)
≤ 1
β
(v(S) + v(`+ 1)) + v(S∗) ≤ 1
β
(v(S) + v(i∗)) + v(S∗) .
By rearranging the terms we get opt(A,B) ≤ 11−
(
1+β
β v(S) +
1
β v(i
∗)
)
.
D.2 Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.3
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We are going to need a slight variant of Mech-SM-frac:
Mech-SM-frac-var(A, v, c, B, γ)
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 if
(
ρ+ 1 +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
· v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 return Greedy-SM(A, v, c, γB/2)
Recall that α = (1 + ρ)
(
2 + ρ+
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
− 1. Now we are ready to state
mechanism Det-Mech-SymSM-frac. Clearly the mechanism runs in polynomial time.
Det-Mech-SymSM-frac(A, v, c, B)
1 Set A′ = {i | ci ≤ B} and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈A′ v(i)
2 if α · v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, ′)
6 if optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B) then
7 return Mech-SM-frac-var(S, v, cS , B, (1− (α+ 2)′))
8 else
9 return Mech-SM-frac-var(A S, v, cA S , B, (1− (α+ 2)′))
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The proof follows the proof of Theorem 4.7. In fact, the monotonicity—and thus
truthfulness and individual rationality—of the mechanism follows from that proof and
the observation that Mech-SM-frac-var is monotone even when v is non-monotone. The
latter is due to the monotonicity of Greedy-SM which is straightforward and is briefly
discussed in Appendix D.1.
We proceed with the approximation ratio. If i∗ is returned in line 3, then
α · v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A′ {i∗}, B) = opt(A {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A,B)− v(i∗) ,
and therefore opt(A,B) ≤ (α+ 1) · v(i∗).
On the other hand, if X is returned by Mech-SM-frac-var in line 7, then we have
α · v(i∗) < optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A,B).
Therefore, v(i∗) < ρα opt(A,B).
At line 6 it must be the case optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B). Thus,
ρ · opt(S,B) = ρ · opt(S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (S ∩A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B)
≥ opt(A′ S,B) = opt(A S,B) ≥ opt(A,B)− opt(S,B) .
Therefore opt(S,B) ≥ 1ρ+1 opt(A,B). Now we need the following lemma about the
performance of Mech-SM-frac-var.
Lemma D.3. For η = ρ+ 1 +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1 and any ′′ > 0, there is a sufficiently small ′
so that opt(S,B) ≤ (η + 1 + ′′)Mech-SM-frac-var(S, v, cS , B, (1− (α+ 2)′)). Moreover
′ only depends on the constants ρ and ′′.
. Let δ = (1− (α+ 2)′)/2. We consider two cases for Mech-SM-frac-var.
If i∗ is returned, then η·v(i∗) ≥ optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≥ opt(A′ {i∗}, B) = opt(A {i∗}, B) ≥
opt(A,B)− v(i∗), and therefore opt(A,B) ≤ (η + 1) · v(i∗).
On the other hand, if the outcome X of Greedy-SM is returned, then η · v(i∗) <
optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ ρ · opt(A,B). Combining this with Lemma D.2
we have
opt(A,B) ≤ 1
1− ′
(
1 + δ
δ
v(X) +
1
δ
ρ
η
opt(A,B)
)
,
or equivalently
opt(A,B) ≤ (1 + δ)η
(1− ′)δη − ρv(X) .
Since lim′→0 (1+δ)η(1−′)δη−ρ =
3η
η−2ρ , we have that for sufficiently small 
′, opt(A,B) ≤(
3η
η−2ρ + 
′′
)
v(X) = (η + 1 + ′′)v(X), where the calculations for the last equality are the
same as in the proof of the approximation ratio of Mech-SM-frac.
Now, combining all the above, we have
opt(A,B) ≤ (ρ+ 1) opt(S,B) ≤ (ρ+ 1)
(
ρ+ 2 + ′′ +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
v(X) .
For ′′ = ρ+1 we have (ρ + 1)
(
ρ+ 2 + ′′ +
√
ρ2 + 4ρ+ 1
)
= α + 1 + , as desired. So,
the ′ used in the mechanism is the one we get from the proof of Lemma D.3 for ′′ = ρ+1 .
The case where X is returned in line 9 is symmetric. We conclude that in any case
opt(A,B) ≤ (α+ 1 + ) · Det-Mech-SymSM-frac(A,B).
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It remains to show that the mechanism is budget feasible. If the winner is i∗ in line
3, then his payment is B. Otherwise, we would like budget-feasibility to follow from the
budget-feasibility of Mech-SM-frac-var and the observation that the comparison in line
3 only gives additional upper bounds on the payments of winners from Mech-SM-frac.
However, the budget-feasibility of Mech-SM-frac-var depends on the budget-feasibility
of Greedy-SM, and according to Lemma D.1 it suffices to have v(X) ≥ 1α+2 · opt(A,B),
where X is the output of Greedy-SM. This, however, follows from the approximation ratio
for  ≤ 1. Thus the mechanism is budget-feasible.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. The proof is identical with the proof of Theorem 5.1 with the
exception of the analysis of the approximation ratio which borrows the ideas of the proof
of Theorem 4.7. So we only focus on the approximation ratio.
If i∗ is returned in line 3, then opt(A,B) ≤ (α+ 1) · v(i∗) like before.
Otherwise, using Theorem 4.6, we have
α · v(i∗) < optf (A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ 4 · opt(A′ {i∗}, B) ≤ 4 · opt(A,B).
Therefore, v(i∗) < 4α opt(A,B) and for the remaining steps of the mechanism we can use
Theorem 4.6 with factor ρ′ = 2 + 8/α.
Without loss if generality, assume that X is returned by Mech-SM-frac-var in line
7. At line 6 it must be the case optf (S ∩ A′, B) ≥ optf (A′ S,B). Thus, following the
previous analysis, opt(S,B) ≥ 1ρ′+1 opt(A,B).
Combining this inequality with Lemma D.3 for ρ′ we get that for ′′ = ρ′+1 there is an
′ such that
opt(A,B) ≤ (ρ′ + 1)
(
ρ′ + 2 + ′′ +
√
ρ′2 + 4ρ′ + 1
)
v(X) = (α+ 1 + ) · v(X) .
This ′ is to be used in the mechanism. Showing that α = 26.245 works is only a matter
of calculations, and for  ≤ 1/200 we get a 27.25-approximate solution.
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